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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DDI-2856-74

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September 27, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 272

TO: The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
 Consultative Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
 Consultative Commission, Geneva, September 24, 1974

The following instructions are approved for the Standing Consultative Commission session beginning on September 24, 1974 in Geneva.

Instructions on Procedures Governing ABM Replacement

1. The U.S. Commissioner should undertake discussions on general approaches to procedures for replacement of operational ABM systems and their components. The objective of this discussion is to provide a framework for working out mutually agreed procedures at subsequent SCC sessions. The U.S. approach is that the procedures should be based on: (1) the agreed guidelines contained in the two "Protocols on Procedures" of July 3, 1974, (2) the ABM Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements, and (3) the Protocol to the ABM Treaty. The procedures should also be consistent with those procedures for dismantling and destruction previously agreed in the SCC, except as modified by these instructions.

2. The U.S. Commissioner should not put forth any proposals for specific procedures. However, he may discuss illustrative specific procedures in explaining and supporting the general U.S. approach. In so doing, he should draw on the material in the Verification Panel Working Group paper, "Criteria for An Approach to Replacement of Operational ABM Systems or Their Components," dated September 11, 1974.

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3. The U.S. Commissioner should emphasize that the procedures to be negotiated must prevent the limits of the ABM Treaty and its Protocol from being exceeded during the replacement process as a result of overlapping operational capabilities, but must provide sufficient flexibility to permit an orderly replacement program.

4. Specifically, the U.S. Commissioner should seek to work out a mutually acceptable approach to:

a. replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to the current ABM deployment areas.

b. replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to the exchange of ABM deployment areas under the provisions of the Protocol to the ABM Treaty of July 3, 1974. The U.S. Commissioner should emphasize that the exchange of ABM deployment areas is of such a nature that the appropriate procedures would not necessarily be the same as those for the current ABM deployment areas.

c. notification procedures consistent with the guidelines in the July 3, 1974, Protocol to the ABM Treaty as well as with the notification procedures for dismantling or destruction previously negotiated in the SCC. The U.S. Commissioner should seek to achieve notification procedures that include:

(1) the numbers, types, and locations of ABM components which are being replaced or which have been replaced,

(2) the numbers, types, and locations of replacement ABM components, and

(3) with respect to the exchange of ABM areas, the location of the new ABM deployment area.

Notification relating to replacement of components within existing ABM deployment areas should be provided at the beginning of regular SCC sessions.

d. determining when an ABM component is "under construction" and when dismantling or destruction of an ABM component must begin, both to be consistent with adequate verification requirements. The

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U.S. SCC Commissioner should emphasize that it may be appropriate to define "under construction" differently for different ABM components.

e. dismantling or destruction procedures for replaced ABM systems or their components consistent with adequate verification requirements taking into account certain operational considerations, in particular in the exchange of ABM deployment areas. The U.S. SCC Commissioner should emphasize that while costs can also be taken into account, it should not be at the expense of any verification requirements.

5. Privacy of the SCC negotiations and the avoidance of leaks must be maintained. All substantive statements on SCC activities are to be cleared at the White House.

Clarification of the SCC Procedures Governing Dismantling or Destruction of Replaced Submarines

1. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the U.S. Commissioner should read into the record a statement along the following lines:

With respect to Paragraph III.2 of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, the United States interpretation of this paragraph is that dismantling or destruction of replaced submarines may be accomplished at shipyards which carry out construction or repairs of submarines.

2. The U.S. Commissioner should seek formal Soviet agreement to the above interpretation.

Pre-agreed Messages for Situations Covered by the Accidents Agreement

1. The President has approved the recommendations of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee with respect to initiating discussion of pre-agreed messages relating to the Accidents Agreement.

2. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the U.S. Commissioner should present for consideration the draft texts of the English language versions of the pre-agreed messages. As appropriate,


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the U. S. Commissioner should draw on the draft Aide Memoire prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee in making this presentation.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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Executive Secretary

30 September 1974

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